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Current Approaches To Foreign Investment Review in Canada
by James M. Spence, Q. C.*
1. INTRODUCTION
in December of 1984, a few months after the new Progressive Conserva-
tive government took office in Canada, Prime Minister Brian Mulroney
announced to the Economic Club of New York that "our message is
clear here and around the world .... Canada is open for business again."
In that address, the Prime Minister emphasized his hopes for a "restora-
tion of good and sound relationships between our two countries."1
The Prime Minister's statement coincided with the tabling in the
House of Commons in Canada of the Investment Canada Bill which the
new government proposed to replace the ten-year old Foreign Invest-
ment Review Act ("FIRA"), which had originally been brought into law
by the Liberal Government of Prime Minister Trudeau.2
Following the tabling of the Bill, Industry Minister Sinclair Stevens
made these statements:
The Investment Canada Bill ... represents the fulfillment of our
campaign promise to change both the name and mandate of the For-
eign Investment Review Agency.
We are proposing to replace FIRA with a new agency, Investment
Canada. The Agency will have a new, positive mandate to encourage
and facilitate investment, the kind of investment that creates jobs, in-
troduces innovative ideas and technologies, and expands Canada's eco-
nomic and industrial base. Canada's interests will be advanced by
encouraging Canadian and non-Canadian investment, not by discour-
aging it. We propose positive measures to achieve positive goals. 3
This legislation became law in Canada at the end of last June, re-
placing the Foreign Investment Review Act and becoming the only law
of general application in Canada relating to the review of foreign invest-
ment in our country.4
* Member of the firm of Tory, Tory, DesLauriers & Binnington (Toronto). Mr. Spence is a
former General Counsel for Turstar Corporation.
I Mulroney's Investment Message to U.S. Like 'Fresh Air,' The Financial Post, December 15,
1984, p. 6.
2 Foreign Investment Review Act, 1973 Can. Stat. ch. 46; Investment Canada Act, Bill C-15,
1st Sess., 33rd Par. 33-34 Eliz. 2, 1984-85, (hereinafter The Act).
3 Statement by the Honourable Sinclair Stevens following the tabling of the Investment Canada
bill, Investment Canada, December 7, 1984.
4 Pursuant to Order in Council PC-1985-2041, the Investment Canada Act came into force on
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2 Summary of the Act
The new Act establishes a new agency, Investment Canada, which
will have a mandate to encourage and facilitate new foreign and domestic
investment in Canada as well as assisting in the review of foreign invest-
ment proposals which require review. The Act removes from the scope
of the review process a number of types of investments which were sub-
ject to review under FIRA. First, the Act establishes thresholds to limit
review of acquisitions by non-Canadians to acquisitions which are of a
major size. For acquisitions below the thresholds, only a notification of
the investment is required. The thresholds for review are:
(a) in the case of a direct acquisition by a non-Canadian, the
acquisition of a business in Canada with assets of $5 million
or more; and
(b) in the case of an indirect acquisition (i.e., one resulting from
the acquisition of a parent company outside Canada), when
the Canadian subsidiary acquired has assets of $50 million or
more (or if the Canadian subsidiary acquired represents
more than 50% of the assets of the acquired group, the Ca-
nadian subsidiary has assets of $5 million or more).
The Act also provides exceptional authority to review acquisitions or in-
vestments to establish new businesses in culturally sensitive sectors such
as book publishing and film production and distribution. Apart from
investments to establish new businesses in areas that may affect our "cul-
tural heritage or national identity," there is no authority to review pro-
posals to establish new businesses, as there was under FIRA. Instead,
with the above exception, all new business establishments are subject
only to the requirement of notification.
The standard to be taken account in determining whether to allow
the investment proposal is whether the investment is likely to provide
"net benefit to Canada." The test under FIRA was "significant benefit to
Canada." In making this determination the Minister responsible for the
Act, who is the deciding authority, is to take into account seven factors,
which focus on the impact of the investment proposal on the following:
1. Economic activity
2. Canadian participation
3. Efficiency and technology
4. Competition
5. Compatibility with federal and provincial economic and indus-
trial policies
6. Compatibility with cultural policy
7. Effect on international competitiveness
The last two of these factors are additions to the list which was set out in
June 30, 1985 except with respect to the repeal of Foreign Investment Review Act and, in that
respect, on July 1, 1985.
Vol. 11:161 1986
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FIRA. Under FIRA, the deciding authority was not the Minister but
rather the Governor in Council-i.e., the full Cabinet. In the course of
the review process, there is to be consultation with the provinces and the
federal government departments that would be significantly affected by
the proposal, as was the case under FIRA.
The time limits under the two Acts are different. Under FIRA, if
the government was unable to reach a decision within 60 days, it was
entitled to extend the time for review for an unlimited period. Under the
new Act, the Minister has a basic period of 45 days for the review of the
proposal. This period can be extended to 75 days but can only be ex-
tended beyond that with the agreement of the investor.
As well as streamlining the scope, standards and timing of the re-
view process, the Act also reduces the types of arrangements that are to
be considered "non-Canadian" and the types of investment which are
considered to be an "acquisition of control."
For example, if two Canadians and one non-Canadian each own
one-third of the voting shares of a company, that company would ordina-
rily be considered non-Canadian for FIRA purposes. Under the new leg-
islation the company would have a good prospect of being considered
Canadian, particularly where the shareholders enter into a shareholders
agreement with terms that will qualify them as a "voting group" under
the new Act.
In the case of a public company, if Canadians own a majority of the
voting shares of the corporation, the corporation will be considered Ca-
nadian-controlled if it can be shown that the corporation is not con-
trolled by a single non-Canadian or by a voting group in which non-
Canadian members own half or more of the voting shares owned by the
group. There is no positive statutory requirement to show that Canadian
shareholders are in control or that a majority of the board of directors is
Canadian, which would likely have been required under FIRA.
If an investor lacks Canadian status, the investor would still be free
to make the following types of investments in a corporation, since none
of these investments is classified as an "acquisition of control":
- a purchase of non-voting shares;
- a purchase of less than one-third of the voting shares, whether
or not this results in a change in actual control of the corpora-
tion; or
- a purchase of more than one-third but less than a majority of
the voting shares, if it can be shown that control is unchanged.
These rules result in considerably increased opportunities for foreign
investors to make corporate business investments in Canada without be-
ing subject to the review requirements of the new Act.
If the foreign investor cannot structure its investment within these
rules, it will have a further alternative which is not available under
FIRA: instead of investing in an existing Canadian business, it could
3
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establish, without review, a new business which is not of a type pre-
scribed by regulation to be related to Canada's "cultural heritage or na-
tional identity."
Other potential opportunities exist where the proposed investment is
to be structured on a non-corporate basis--e.g., as a partnership or a
joint venture.
In the statement referred to earlier, Mr. Stevens went on to make
the following remarks about the underlying rationale of the new
legislation.
We believe that the establishment of new businesses is beneficial to
Canada. That is why we propose in the new Act to exempt new busi-
ness investment from review. We are also proposing to confine the
review of investments to acquisitions that can have an important im-
pact on our economic, industrial and cultural life. By exempting new
business investment and by limiting review to larger acquisitions, we
will reduce by about 90% the number of transactions which are now
subject to review under the Foreign Investment Review Act. So, when
we say that we want to dismantle needless barriers to enterprise in this
country, we mean it.
At the same time we believe that Canada requires the means to
safeguard its national interests. Industrialized countries do not simply
throw their doors open and invite others to take over the components
of their economic, cultural and political sovereignty. It is for that rea-
son that we have retained a review mechanism.
It was generally recognized in Canada that the announcement of the
new legislation was a major initiative on the part of the new government.
The Financial Post of Canada remarked on the event as follows:
The perception of the Foreign Investment Review Agency, and
the legislation that underpinned it, may have been worse than reality.
But perception counts heavily when it comes to decisions on where to
do business and where to put your money. And it's plain that many
foreign investors steered clear of Canada because of FIRA. That's
why the government's decision to replace it with a new Agency called
Investment Canada as announced by Industry Minister Sinclair Ste-
vens, is most welcome....
Of just as much value as cutting down on the review process is the
Agency's fresh mandate to aggressively promote new investment, espe-
cially joint venture projects with Canadian partners and investments in
the high-tech field. This is the sort of activity, along with the positive
message Prime Minister Brian Mulroney gave to U.S. executives this
week in New York, that should help dispel the negative perception many
business people have of Canada.6
5 Supra, note 3.
6 Opening the Doors, The Financial Post, Dec. 15, 1985.
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3. The Experience to Date
At a superficial level, it is quite easy to state what the experience to
date has been with the Progressive Conservative government in the area
of foreign investment review and to show how that record contrasts with
the record of the previous government. The Conservative government
has not turned down any case which it has decided, either under FIRA
or under the Investment Canada Act. In contrast under the Liberal gov-
ernment which was in power for most of the 10 year lifetime of FIRA,
there was typically some percentage of disallowed cases, ranging from a
high in the teens to a low percentage of well under 10%.
That contrast may, however, be superficial and inadequate for a
number of reasons. First, the Conservative government has been in
power for only one year and the record shows only the cases decided, not
the cases which have been submitted for review but, for one reason or
another, have not yet worked their way through the system to a decision.
As a related matter it appears that some difficult cases, particularly in the
area of the cultural industries, have been brought before the government
but still remain to be decided; this matter is considered further below.
Moreover, there is nothing in the scheme of the legislation which re-
quires the government to maintain the level of allowances at any particu-
lar percentage. On the other hand, it seems clear to most observers that
the present government is fully committed to its widely heralded pro-
business, pro-investment approach. It therefore seems highly unlikely
that the government would move away, to any significant degree, from a
close-to-full approval record. This should not be taken as a prediction
that all of the cases that are approved will go through the system rou-
tinely. While I believe that that will be true of most of the cases, I also
believe that, even with this government, there are reasons to expect that
some major cases will encounter delays and demands that the parties to
the transactions may well consider highly significant. In what follows in
this paper, I hope to explain some of the reasons for this view and to
indicate some of the forms that these complications may take.
4. Potential Complications
In considering where complications may arise in future in the course
of the administration of the new Act, it is instructive to take into account
the kinds of criticisms that were made of FIRA and its administration,
both by non-Canadian (principally U.S.) and Canadian critics. In the
first group of factors considered below, the potential for trouble along the
lines of the traditional criticisms is explored. Following that, the discus-
sion moves on to consider some of the potential complications that could
arise with respect to specific policies of the Conservative government,
some explicit and others not entirely explicit, which bear upon foreign
investment review.
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(a) Indirect Acquisitions
The requirement for review under FIRA of indirect acquisitions was
a continuing source of irritation to various critics of FIRA. Here is one
formulation of the criticism:
FIRA review of mergers between U.S. parent companies that in-
volve transfer of ownership of a Canadian subsidiary (whether or not
the merger results in an increased level of foreign ownership of the
Canadian subsidiary) has extra-territorial applicability and has the ca-
pacity to necessitate a forced sale of a Canadian subsidiary by the ac-
quiring U.S. company. This may have expropriatory implications and
can reduce U.S. exports to Canada.7
Under the new Act, indirect acquisitions are still reviewable, but the
force of the above criticism must be considerably weakened by the fact
that the thresholds for review in the case of indirect acquisitions have
been raised enormously. Under FIRA, any indirect acquisition was re-
viewable. Under the new Act the indirect acquisition would be review-
able only if the Canadian business has gross assets of $50 million or,
where it represents more than half of the global assets of the acquired
business, it has gross assets over $5 million. Although this should cer-
tainly reduce the potential for irritation to a very considerable extent, it
will not necessarily eliminate it entirely. For example, it seems reason-
able to expect that in the oil and gas industry some indirect acquisitions
will occur from time to time which will exceed the $50 million threshold,
and it would seem that this is an industry where the government feels
bound to assert special requirements for the approval of foreign invest-
ment; this matter is considered further below.' Moreover, it may be fair
to expect that any transaction involving a Canadian company with gross
assets of $50 million or more will likely, because of its size and the public
attention it will attract, require the government to subject it to a degree
of special scrutiny.
(b) Delays
Delays in the review process were a criticism under FIRA at various
times until around mid-1982 when it became apparent that the streamlin-
ing of FIRA procedures was being implemented effectively. One report
in November, 1982 described the development this way: "Foreigners are
finding it twice as fast and twice as easy to invest in Canada. . . ."' The
process of accelerating the review process appeared to have taken hold in
the administration of the Act by 1983: it could generally be expected
7 Hearings of the Sub-Committees on Inter-American Affairs and on International Economic
Policy, Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, D.C., Oct. 21,
1981, [hereinafter The Hearings] (statement of Raymond J. Waldmann, Ass't. Secretary for Int'l.
Economic Policy, U.S. Dept. of Commerce.)
8 Infra pt. 4(f), Oil and Gas Industry, at p. 17.
9 FIRA's Rejections are Halved, The Globe and Mail, Nov. 9, 1982.
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that a smaller transaction would be decided within about a month and a
larger transaction within about two months. When the Progressive Con-
servative Government came into power, the general impression was that
the decision times were about the same or perhaps improved.
The new Act seems to have at least two factors in it that would
potentially make for an elimination or reduction in delays. One of these
is the provision that limits the review time to 75 days except where the
parties agree otherwise. The second is that the deciding authority is the
Minister rather than the Cabinet. It should be noted, however, that an
investor might well wish to extend the review period beyond the 75 days.
That could typically be the case where it was apparent that, otherwise,
the Minister was going to consider himself bound to disallow the pro-
posed investment. Secondly, while it will certainly be beneficial to the
timing of decisions that the matter need not go to the Cabinet, the Minis-
ter is himself of necessity an extremely busy man with a number of prior-
ity demands upon his time. Consequently, in a case which he considers
difficult to approve, there may be a potential for delay and a good reason
for the investor to agree, albeit grudgingly, to such delay.
The government has not yet released information relating to the av-
erage time taken for the review process under FIRA and under the new
Act under the administration of the new government. There has been at
least one decision which would indicate a potential for delays in the oper-
ation of the review process. On August 9, 1985, Industry Minister Sin-
clair Stevens announced a decision of approval in the acquisition by
Alexander & Alexander Services Inc. of New York of control of the busi-
ness of Reed Stenhouse Company Limited of Toronto. This transaction,
which resulted in the formation of one of the world's largest insurance
brokerage companies, was a carryover from the Foreign Investment Re-
view Act under which it had been submitted for review some 6 months
previously, according to a press release by Alexander & Alexander."0
(c) Vagueness of Standards
This point was put succinctly by one U.S. commentator as follows:
"In judging an application by a foreign investor, FIRA applies a
vague standard: whether there is a significant benefit to Canada."' 1
The test under the new Act of "net benefit" is certainly different
from "significant benefit": it would appear to mean that the prospective
benefit must outweigh the prospective detriment (if any) but that it need
not do so to any significant degree. In this sense, it may not be different
from a test of "no detriment." However, since the factors to be taken
10 Investment Canada Release IC-2, Ottawa, Aug. 9, 1985. In its press release dated June 17,
1985, Alexander & Alexander Services Inc. stated that its application for approval of the transaction
was filed on Feb. 1, 1985.
1I The Hearings, (statement of Ernest B. Johnston, Jr., acting Asst. Secretary, Economic and
Business Affairs, U.S. Department of State).
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into account by the Minister in deciding whether there is a prospect of
net benefit are of the same degree of generality, and are in fact largely the
same, as the factors under FIRA, there would still seem to be ample
room for the exercise of discretion on the part of the deciding authority.
In this respect, it would appear that the standards are no more specific or
objective than they were under FIRA. On reflection, this perhaps should
not seem very surprising, given the fact that the statute has the broadest
possible application and models designed for specific industries or indus-
try sectors would provide only limited guidance in the formulation of
general standards.
In the absence of more specific guidance on the meaning of "net
benefits," it seems that the best one can do is to refer to the accumulating
experience under the legislation and the known concerns and priorities of
the government of the day. On this basis, a rough and incomplete list of
types of transactions that would likely be singled out for special scrutiny
under the Act would run somewhat as follows:
(i) very large transactions;
(ii) acquisitions that might have a strategic affect on the strength
and international competitiveness of Canadian companies;
(iii) acquisitions that will cause a reduction in employment in
Canada;
(iv) transactions which, because of highly visible economic conse-
quences or other reasons, will attract adverse public comment
and give rise to political concerns and anxieties.
Of course the question in such transactions is: what can the investor
do to bring about a favourable decision on its investment? Here it is very
likely that it will be necessary to resort to giving undertakings to the
government relating to the manner in which the business will be carried
on and/or owned. More is said on this subject below.
(d) Lack of Transparency
The FIRA review procedure was frequently criticized for lacking
explicitness and openness in its decision-making process. 12 This criticism
would seem to be conceptually allied with the criticism discussed above
concerning the vagueness of the standard for decision. Under FIRA, the
investor typically made its submissions to Agency officials and depended
on them for an indication as to how well the file was progressing in the
judgment of the Minister and the Cabinet. It was unusual for the inves-
tor to meet with the Minister and, so far as I know, no investor ever met
with the Cabinet or a Cabinet committee as such. It was my impression
that the Agency under FIRA endeavoured to ensure that the investor
had a good understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of the file as
they were seen by the Agency and I believe this continues to be the prac-
12 FIRA's Operations Chill Investors, U.S. Envoy Says, The Globe and Mail, Sept. 8, 1982.
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tice. However, it was not and is not the practice of the Agency to dis-
close to the investor the text of any written memorandum going forward
to the Minister with reference to the merits of the application and it may
well be that there are matters that the Agency feels, for administrative
reasons, it cannot disclose to the investor. Now that the administration
of the legislation is in the hands of a single minister rather than the Cabi-
net, there is a better prospect of communicating, where necessary, with
the deciding authority. Indeed, Mr. Stevens has met with representatives
of investors in various cases and has in fact directly engaged in negotiat-
ing with investors undertakings that have been considered critical to the
favourable decision in those cases. For the reasons mentioned earlier in
connection with the demands upon the Minister's time, one would not
expect this type of direct communication with the Minister to occur very
frequently.
(e) Undertakings
FIRA, like the new Act, contained provisions enabling foreign in-
vestors to give undertakings relating to the future ownership and per-
formance of the acquired business and authorizing the deciding authority
to take such undertakings into account in reaching a decision.13 One
U.S. criticism of this practice was as follows:
As a condition for new foreign investment, FIRA signs legally
enforceable agreements with foreign investors specifying when firms
must buy Canadian goods, in violation of the provisions of GATT...
FIRA may also require firms to export a specific share of their Canada
production, which can distort trade flows. Foreign firms may also be
prevented from distributing their products in Canada, which can seri-
ously restrict trade. The United States is seeking a complete elimina-
tion of these requirements.1
4
Following these and other criticisms, the Agency's practice in re-
spect of undertakings was altered to focus exclusively on matter that
were considered to be "key" to the approval, and to ignore for the most
part possible undertakings on non-essential matters. Now, with the ad-
vent of the new Act it appears that the role of undertakings is to be
diminished further. According to a report in the Financial Post of
Canada:
Industry Minister Sinclair Stevens is getting ready to announce a
13 Foreign Investment Review Act, 1973 Can. Stat. ch. 46, §§ 9, 21, Investment Canada Act,
Bill C-15, 33-34 Eliz. 2, 1984-85, §§ 19(c), 21.
14 The Hearings, (statement of David R. MacDonald, Deputy United States Trade Representa-
tive). Subsequently, in January of 1982, the United States requested consultations with Canada
regarding FIRA under Art. 22 of GATT. In March of 1982, the United States presented a formal
request for the creation of a panel under Art. 23 of the GATT to examine FIRA and to rule on its
compliance with GATT requirements. See also S. CLARKSON, CANADA AND THE REAGAN CHAL-
LENGE: CRISIS IN THE CANADIAN AMERICAN RELATIONSHIP (James Lorimer & Co., Toronto,
1982), at 47.
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further softening of the already much diminished foreign investment
review process. In particular, Investment Canada's controversial prac-
tice of negotiating legally binding "Canada benefits" conditions with
foreign investors on certain takeovers is to be substantially curtailed.
(These undertakings, rarely appreciated by foreign business people,
are a leftover from FIRA days. Mostly they're promises to pursue cor-
porate policies that will benefit the Canadian economy-for example, to
continue local sourcing, maintain the existing level of Canadian employ-
ment, give Canadian operations a world product mandate, and the like-
in return for government approval of the investment.)15
The practice of the Agency seems to be consistent with this report.
In discussions and representations relating to proposed acquisitions,
Agency officials will frequently ask for clarification or elaboration of
items in the statement of plans contained in the application. Usually,
where they are satisfied that the additional comments are consistent with
the original application and do not significantly alter the information in
it, the inquiry will stop at that point. If it is felt that the further com-
ments add significantly to the business plans, the investor may be invited
to submit the additional information as a supplement to the plans. While
this seems to be the practice for the most part, this should not be taken as
an indication that undertakings are never used. On the contrary, under-
takings are still used in significant cases. In particular, based only on
personal experience, my judgment is that where a case is considered im-
portant enough to warrant the personal involvement of the Minister in
negotiating some conditions for the approval, it is ordinarily to be ex-
pected that those conditions will be set down in writing in the form of
undertakings. On what sorts of matters might a foreign investor expect
to be invited to give undertakings under the new Act? It is, of course,
early to tell, but experience to date would suggest that the most impor-
tant matters will be the maintenance of Canadian operations and activi-
ties-with related undertakings as to the continuation of employment in
Canada, management of the business in Canada and the head office of the
business in Canada-and the maintenance or enhancement of the degree
of Canadian ownership in the business.
I think most observers of the present government, when it was in its
formulative stages in opposition, would not have expected it to interest
itself in undertakings as to the degree of Canadian ownership; that was
usually thought to be a shibboleth unique to the Liberal government and
their nationalist following. It appears to me that the present government
is not likely to seek such undertakings for traditionally nationalist mo-
tives. Instead, the government will be prepared to resort to such under-
takings as an additional means of ensuring continuing business
operations in Canada, on the assumption that operations will to some
extent go where the ownership is, and also to ward off adverse nationalist
15 Investment Door Opens, The Financial Post, Aug. 24, 1985, at 1, 2.
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comment on its foreign investment decisions. In any event, my conclu-
sion so far is that this government is not prepared to forego ownership
commitments entirely.
A question of a different type about undertakings concerns under-
takings that were given under FIRA in circumstances where no under-
takings would be required now under the new Act if the investment were
made today. For example, a company wishing to establish an automobile
distributorship in Canada would not need any Investment Canada ap-
proval to do so but might well have required a FIRA approval prior to
last July. If the investor came in in that earlier period when FIRA was
in force and gave undertakings, it might well feel that it is potentially
prejudiced in its competitive efforts against new competitors who now
enter the market without any similar need to provide undertakings. It
seems likely that, over time, investors who feel that they are suffering
prejudice in the circumstances will seek some relief from the government.
I would not be surprised if the government decided to give favourable
treatment to those requests in due course but I would not look for it to
happen too soon.
(f) Oil and Gas Industry
The Liberal government of Prime Minister Trudeau introduced, in
1980, the National Energy Program to enhance the availability to
Canadians of the energy resources in Canada. Included in the objectives
of the program was the enhancement of Canadian ownership in the oil
and gas industry; specifically, the state objective was to attain 50% Cana-
dian ownership in the industry by 1990.16 Another priority objective of
the program was to enhance the amount and timing of oil and gas explo-
ration and development in Canada, including in particular in the frontier
and off-shore areas under the jurisdiction of the Federal Government. It
was made clear that FIRA would have a role to play in fostering the
achievement of these objectives. 17 Accordingly, it came as no surprise to
practitioners that it was ordinarily very difficult to obtain approval for a
significant foreign investment in the oil and gas industry unless it was
accompanied by undertakings of two types:
(i) commitments to enhance the Canadian ownership in the ac-
quired business in a manner that would contribute to the stated
government objective of 50% Canadian ownership within the
industry; and
(ii) major commitments to fund new exploration and development
activity in Canada.
While a number of acquisitions in the oil and gas industry were allowed,
16 The National Energy Program was announced by the Minister of Energy, Mines, and Re-
sources Canada, as part of the Federal Budget in Nov. 1980, and deals with issues of pricing, owner-
ship, security of supply and taxation in the oil and gas industry.
17 The National Energy Program, supra note 16.
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they almost invariably were accompanied by press releases indicating
commitments along these lines. Perhaps the most spectacular of these
was the allowance of the Getty Oil indirect acquisition of Canadian Re-
serve in 1982. At the time, Getty agreed to sell 50% of Canadian Re-
serve to Canadians over 5 years and to spend hundreds of millions of
dollars on petroleum exploration and development and on research
projects over 10 years.' 8
Against this background and in the light of some pre-election an-
nouncements from Progressive Conservative party spokesman that their
party would treat oil and gas as a sensitive area requiring special stan-
dards of Canadian ownership, interested observers watched closely to see
how the new government would handle the major oil and gas transac-
tions that started to line up on the horizon. Of the four cases that mate-
rialized, three-Voyager Petroleums, Texaco and Gulf have all been
resolved with approvals, but in all cases accompanied by significant com-
mitments relating to ownership and performance. Indeed, as is well
known, in the case of the Chevron acquisition of Gulf, the ultimate result
has been the disposition of Gulf Canada to Olympia and York Resources
Inc. of Toronto, with related transactions with Petro-Canada and others
relating to component parts of the Gulf assets.
It is instructive to consider the commitments that were given in each
of the decided cases, according to government press releases. 19 In sum-
mary, they are as follows:
(i) Voyager-to sell 35% of the equity to Canadians within 5
years and to offer an additional 35% to 50% of the explora-
tory property for joint development with Canadians and to
spend $100 million on exploration and development.
(ii) Texaco-to provide Canadians a full and fair opportunity to
acquire control of the Getty Mining and Minerals Companies
which Texaco was seeking to sell; to offer to sell in Canada
within approximately three years an additional 10%, approxi-
mately, of common shares of Texaco Canada; and to make
capital and exploration expenditures of not less than $1.7 bil-
lion in Canada by the end of 1988.
(iii) Chevron-to offer its shareholding in Gulf Canada Limited
for sale to Canadian-controlled purchasers for a fair and rea-
sonable price, and failing any such sale, to ensure that Canadi-
ans had the opportunity to participate in the ownership of
Chevron's combined business in Canada, including Gulf Can-
ada, to an extent greater by at least 20% by the end of 1989,
18 Foreign Investment Curbs Still Have Teeth, The Financial Post, Feb. 16, 1985, at 4.
19 With respect to the Voyager case, The Financial Post, supra note 18, and Canada Warms up
to U.S. Business, Fortune, Mar. 4, 1985, at 114-115, and FIRA Denies Oil Deal is Major Shift, The
Globe and Mail, Oct. 13, 1984, at B 12. As to Texaco and Chevron, The Financial Post, supra note
18, and FIRA Releases, Ottawa, Feb. 7, 1985.
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along with other commitments to maintain Canadian owner-
ship in the Hibernia interests or to maintain future exploration
and development efforts in Canada at planned levels indicated
in the range of $800 million for 1985.
(iv) Mobil-to increase both Canadian ownership and exploration
expenditures, including giving Canadians the opportunity to
purchase upstream oil and gas properties valued at $350 mil-
lion within the next four years and reinvesting $1.4 billion in
Canada during that period.
One assessment in the press of these cases is that they indicate that
the demands being placed by the present government on foreign investors
in major oil and gas transactions are more relaxed than under the Liber-
als.2" This may well be so. For example, it would appear that while the
government was concerned to ensure that major commitments on Cana-
dian ownership were given, they apparently did not feel bound to ensure
that those commitments amounted to 50% ownership of each company
by 1990. Industry participants will have to decide for themselves
whether the apparent degree of relaxation and flexibility is in fact signifi-
cant. It certainly appears to a non-industry observer that the commit-
ments would fairly be characterized as major from any relevant
perspective.
It is equally clear that the government places great importance on
the end result of these transactions. In a release from Investment Can-
ada on August 2, 1985, Mr. Stevens is reported to have said, "By this
purchase of Chevron's controlling interest in Gulf Canada, some $5.6
billion in assets become Canadian-controlled. This is the largest instance
of Canadianization in the history of the Canadian oil and gas industry.
An equally important fact is that this Canadianization has been achieved
through the private sector."'2 1
(g) Cultural Industry
As mentioned earlier the Investment Canada Act provides for the
review of acquisitions falling below the statutory thresholds and of the
establishment of new businesses of a type "related to Canada's cultural
heritage or national identity" where the Cabinet issues an order for the
review of the investment. Potentially, therefore, any "culturally sensi-
tive" investment, whether by way of acquisition or by way of establish-
ment of a new business, is subject to review. This gives critical
importance to the definition attributed to the term "Canada's cultural
heritage or national identity." The relevant regulation identifies the fol-
lowing four types of business as being related to Canada's cultural heri-
tage or national identity:
20 The Financial Post, supra note 18.
21 Investment Canada Release, Ottawa, Aug. 2, 1985.
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1. Publication, distribution or sale of books, magazines, periodicals
or newspapers in print or machine readable form.
2. Production, distribution, sale or exhibition of film or video
products.
3. Production, distribution, sale or exhibition of audio or video
music recordings.
4. Publication, distribution or sale of music in print or machine
readable form.22
Observers of Canada's foreign investment regulation did not expect
this area of cultural industries to be a quiet corner of the legislation, and
it has not been. In December, 1984, Gulf and Western Industries Inc. of
New York announced its indirect acquisition of Prentice-Hall Canada
Ltd. of Toronto, a transaction that was apparently reviewable under
FIRA and was continued under the new Act by reason of a Cabinet or-
der under section 15 of the new Act. Subsequently, at about the time the
new Act came into force, W.H. Smith and Sons of England announced
its proposed takeover of Classic Books of Toronto, a transaction which is
also subject to Investment Canada approval. The Cabinet also directed
the review under the Investment Canada Act of three other publish-
ing/media transactions, one of which was subsequently approved on July
12.23
On July 6, 1985 Mr. Marcel Masse, the Communications Minister,
announced the Government of Canada's policy on foreign investment in
the Canadian book publishing and distribution industry.24
"The Government believes that it is essential that there be a strong
book publishing and distribution industry that is owned and controlled
by Canadians, one able to perform effectively its important role in defin-
ing Canada's social and cultural identity. . ." Mr. Masse said that the
Government will, in accordance with the provisions of the Investment
Canada Act, review all proposed foreign investment, both direct and in-
direct, in book publishing.
Concerning direct investment, the Minister stated:
The government will look with favour on proposals to establish
new businesses or to acquire directly existing businesses, whether Ca-
nadian or foreign controlled, provided the investment is through a
joint venture with Canadian control. For direct acquisitions of for-
eign-controlled businesses, allowances will be possible if the divestiture
of control to Canadians occurs within a reasonable period of (two
years) at a fair market price.
The Minister stated that the government will review indirect acqui-
22 Investment Canada Act, Bill C-15; 33-34 Eliz. 2, 1984-85, § 15. Investment Canada Regula-
tions, P.C.-1985-2044.
23 PRENTICE-HALL CANADA, INC., FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN CANADA, Report Bulletin no.
B15, July 15, 1985, at 1-3.
24 Dept. of Communications News Release, July 6, 1985.
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sitions case by case. It will generally allow such acquisitions provided,
first, that the acquisition would not significantly lessen effective competi-
tion by Canadians in any segment of the book market and, second, that
the applicant undertakes to divest control of the business to Canadians at
a fair market price within two years.
The Minister also said:
This policy confirms the government's commitment, as annunci-
ated in the Investment Canada Act, to maintaining Canada's cultural
sovereignty and supporting the economic viability of the nation's cru-
cially important cultural industries... In particular, the government
recognizes that the Canadian publishing industry must have opportu-
nities to grow within its own domestic market and that foreign invest-
ment should not be allowed to jeopardize such development.
(h) The Trade Agenda
Canada's foreign investment review practices have bumped up
against its international trade policies and treaty obligations in the past.
With the increasing attention being paid to world trade negotiations with
the United States in particular, the interaction of foreign investment re-
view policy with trade policy may become a more urgent matter in the
foreseeable future.
In the only challenge to FIRA under GATT to date, the GATT
panel ruled that the Canadian government practice of favouring "buy
Canadian" undertakings from foreign investors breached the GATT pro-
vision which requires GATT members to offer foreign traders "national
treatment in their domestic markets."2 The implications of this devel-
opment were by no means clear. It seemed possible that Canada might
well be able to bring itself into compliance with the ruling by substituting
for the typical undertaking a new form of undertaking to the effect that
the investor would ensure that Canadian suppliers have an opportunity
to bid and that all competitive bids would be given equal consideration.26
There was one feature of the panel decision which was favourable to the
Canadian government position: the panel did not find any contravention
in the FIRA practice of receiving commitments from foreign investors
that they would increase their exports from their Canadian operations.
This might have strengthened FIRA efforts to encourage "world product
mandate" undertakings in appropriate cases.
This decision does not necessarily exhaust the range of complaints
that might be made against Canada's foreign review legislation and prac-
tice under the terms of the GATT. The question has been raised, and
may be raised again, "whether undertakings, exacted under pressure,...
25 Arnett and Mendes, Restrictive Trade Policies Could Backfire, The Financial Post, July 23,
1983.
26 P. HAYDEN, Further Musings on the GATT Ruling FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN CANADA
(Hayden & Burns eds. 1974).
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after a major investment has been made, to achieve percentage levels in
repair, maintenance and Canadian value-added or to use a specific...
system are not in effect more demanding than higher tariff levels or as
demanding as quantitative restrictions, both of which are prescribed by
GATT.,,27
This type of consideration may well give rise to heightened concerns
if Canada and the United States move, as many expect them to, into
bilateral discussions to explore the feasibility of a comprehensive trade
agreement. If the United States government continues to perceive Can-
ada's foreign investment policy, even at its present relatively relaxed
level, as a type of anti-free-trade posture, the Canadian government
might well come under pressure for further relaxation of the review pro-
cess and perhaps its entire elimination.2" Such a development would not
be beyond the realm of probability. While official U.S. government state-
ments regarding Canadian foreign investment review law have generally
taken care to state that there is no dispute as to the legitimacy of the
legislation as such, U.S. criticism of the legislation always seems to have
the potential to move in that direction. Such a move would be consistent
with reflections such as those contained in the statement of C. Bergsten
to the U.S. Senate Sub-Committee on International Economic Policy in
July of 1981, in which he suggested "the possibility of a new strategy for
U.S. international investment policy-a major multi-lateral effort to de-
velop a new 'GATT for investment.' "29
(i) The Positive Mandate of the Agency
In any discussion of the potential complications facing the adminis-
tration of the new Act, it is important not to lose sight of the fact that the
government has given the new Agency a specific positive mandate to fos-
ter new investment from foreign sources."0 While the concept of seeking
out attractive foreign investment is itself not new, there are indications
that the government proposes to carry out a coordinated program with
this objective. A recent report mentioned a program of ministerial visits,
the appointment of special investment counselors in key foreign diplo-
matic posts, a stepped-up advertising campaign and the launching of gov-
ernment-sponsored investment seminars for prospective investors.
Within Investment Canada itself a new investment development division
has been formed and is reportedly ready to start.3" There is no question
27 Canadian Industrial Policy Objectives and Article III of GA TT. National Ambitions and In-
ternational Obligations, 6 CAN. Bus. L.J., 385, at 396, 404-405 (1981-82).
28 J.M. SPENCE, FIRA: A Decade of Evolution, in FOREIGN INVESTMENT REVIEW LAW IN
CANADA, (Spence & Rosenfeld eds. 1984).
29 Hearings of the Sub-Committee on International Economic Policy, Committee on Foreign
Relations, U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C. July 30, 1981. (Statement of C. Fred Bergsten, Interna-
tional Investment: The Needfor a New U.S. Policy).
30 For a discussion of earlier considerations see SPENCE, supra note 28, at 340-341.
31 The Financial Post, supra note 15, at 2.
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that a positive program of this type can be of assistance. It is reported
that already, "interested foreign investors are coming to Investment Can-
ada for assistance in locating business opportunities or ironing out regu-
latory red tape."32 One area in particular where the Agency may well be
of assistance is in negotiating favourable rulings or other determinations
by other government departments, such as tax rulings from the Depart-
ment of National Revenue. The report mentioned earlier comments that
the Agency will be "monitoring tax rates, government regulations and
even broader issues such as labour costs, and making comparisons with
other countries."' 33 Early, and potentially dramatic, evidence of the pro-
spective success of this range of measures may be found in recent reports
about the results of Mr. Stevens' discussions in the Pacific Rim and Ja-
pan. Proposals for new foreign investments in major automotive plants
in Canada are under way with Honda, Hyundai, Toyota and Susuki. At
the time of the preparation of this paper announcements about some of
these projects have been made and other announcements may be immi-
nent.34 Positive results in these discussions are obviously important in
themselves and could also have significant influence on other prospective
foreign investors.
5. Summary
Whether the government succeeds with the new approach to foreign
investment regulation in Canada depends on a number of possible alter-
native developments and the order in which they occur. If the govern-
ment succeeds in arranging new beneficial investment of the type now
being discussed in connection with new automotive plants, it is fair to
expect that that will win a good press in Canada and also influence for-
eign observers. On the other hand, if new investment develops only very
slowly and in the meantime the government is forced to take some hard
decisions on, for example, the cultural cases, there will be a risk of dis-
pleasing significant constituencies either in Canada or abroad. If, in the
meantime, some of the existing foreign investment in Canada folds up
with consequent loss of employment in Canada this will be bad news
domestically and may adversely affect the government's posture on for-
eign investment. Finally, if Canada-U.S. bilateral trade negotiations are
initiated and these negotiations turn the spotlight on Canada's foreign
investment policy in a critical fashion, this could lead to a degree of ad-
verse reaction in Canada detrimental to the policies themselves and also
to the trade talks. It seems to me that it would be very difficult in the
present climate for the Canadian government to tighten up its foreign
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 See Canada May Capture More Auto Plants, Toronto Star, Sept. 3, 1985; Stevens Plans Not
to Intervene in Toyota's Choice of Location, The Globe and Mail, Sept. 4, 1985, § B2, at 2; and
Hyundai's Canadian Plant May Spur Others, The Financial Post, Sept. 7, 1985, at 9.
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investment review controls but it would probably be equally difficult to
loosen those controls to the point of effectively eliminating them.35
35 The question whether further innovations in Canada's foreign investment review legislation
are needed was addressed in the recent report of the Royal Commission on the Economic Union and
Development Prospects for Canada.
"The review of foreign investment proposals should be conducted by a quasi-judicial tribu-
nal to ensure full public disclosure and political accountability. Fast-track procedures and
practices for the handling of commercial confidences would need to be developed. Com-
missioners believe that new foreign investments need no longer be reviewed; the tribunal
should review acquisitions only. The threshold for review should be raised from $5 million
in gross assets to at least $50 million in order to focus resources on the larger and more
critical take-overs. The review process should emphasize the competitive and technologi-
cal conditions surrounding the proposed foreign take-over. The government should clarify
the standards governing the post-entry behaviour of foreign investors by promulgating a
general code of conduct applicable to all major firms, domestic and foreign, operating in
Canada. To promote compliance with the code of conduct and to improve our understand-
ing of the consequences of foreign control, the government should legislate an annual re-
porting requirement for all major firms or for corporate groups operating in Canada with
assets in excess of $50 million. Firms should be required to disclose specific types of infor-
mation relevant to their observance of these guidelines. Canadian directors should be re-
quired to file an annual statement detailing their firm's efforts to achieve the objectives of
enterprise performance set out in the proposed code of conduct."
See REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON THE ECONOMIC UNION AND DEVELOPMENT PROS-
PECTS FOR CANADA, Vol. Three, at 430, (1985).
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